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We introduce the layered agent architecture DiPRA (Distributed Practical Reasoning Ar-
chitecture), composed of an ‘intentional’ layer, which includes beliefs, plans and goals, and
a ‘sensorimotor’ layer, which includes schemas for situated action. DiPRA’s functioning is
illustrated and evaluated in a simulated guards-and-thieves scenario. We also discuss the effi-
cacy of the main features of DiPRA, such as the division of labour between off-line planning
and on-line specification of action, the grounding of beliefs in sensorimotor interaction and
anticipation, the use of bounded resources and knowledge, and the realization of deliberation
and means-ends reasoning as intertwined processes.
Keywords:
layered architecture; practical reasoning; grounding; anticipation; schema
1. Introduction
Traditional theories in cognitive science distinguish between intentional (or willed)
and automatic levels of action control. According to these theories, selection of ap-
propriate action as well as perception of events result from two conflicting processes:
goal-directed strategies and stimulus-driven action tendencies. Probably the best
known example is the two-layered model of Norman and Shallice (1986) in which
the higher layer, called ‘supervisory attentional system’ (SAS), is responsible for
executive processes (mainly deliberation and planning intentional action) on the
basis of available knowledge, and the lower level, which includes multiple, com-
peting sensorimotor schemas and a ‘contention scheduling’ mechanism (CS), is
responsible for situated action execution.
Based on such theoretical models, we have built a layered agent architecture that
integrates intentional and sensorimotor behavior in two ways: 1) Courses of action
planned in the intentional layer are realized by action schemas at the sensorimotor
layer. 2) Schemas’ activity produces grounded beliefs, which are therefore used in
the higher layer for practical reasoning. The architecture has been implemented
and tested in a simulation of a guards-and-thieves scenario using the Irrlicht simu-
lation engine (irrlicht.sourceforge.net) with realistic ODE physics (www.ode.org).
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Schema training was performed, with results showing clear improvement over non-
intentional approaches.
Our computational model relates to numerous others that utilize hierarchies of
control. For example, Cooper and Shallice (2006) have implemented a computa-
tional system having a hierarchy of goals and schemas which compete for execution,
and Glasspool and Cooper (2002) provided a model of higher level executive func-
tions; see also (Botvinick 2008) for a recent review of alternative implementations of
hierarchical control architectures. Hybrid cognitive architectures provide another
well known example of systems that include executive processes and actuation.
Most of these include two layers with different computational tasks: the higher
layer is devoted to planning and reasoning, while the lower layer executes actions.
Some examples of layered architectures are ACT-R (Anderson 1983), atlantis (Gat
1992) and CLARION (Sun 2002), all having two layers: ‘deliberative’ and ‘senso-
rimotor’. In these architectures the representational format is not homogeneous in
the two layers. For example, ACT-R and CLARION adopt subsymbolic represen-
tations in the lower layer, and symbolic representations in the higher layer; this
reflects a distinction popular in the psychological literature between procedural and
declarative knowledge (Anderson 1983). All these systems have significant influence
in the cognitive science community. However, they lack realistic ‘embodiment’: they
have highly simplified perception and actuation, and the symbols they use for rea-
soning are not autonomously generated but predefined by their programmers. In
examining the issue of the quality of cognitive models that lack embodiment and
situatedness (Clark 1998), it is clear that, no matter how good these models are,
they cannot be directly used for the realization of robots or agent architectures
operating autonomously in open-ended environments.
Indeed, most of the robot architectures that integrate goal-directed and auto-
matic control and operate in open-ended environments have simplified higher level
cognitive capabilities. One popular example is the behavior networks architecture
(BN) (Dorer 1999, Maes 1990), which is able to maintain competing goals and
trigger them on the basis of continuously updated knowledge. In BN(s) the key
elements are to maintain knowledge representation as simple and homogeneous as
possible, so to speed up all processing, and to use a fixed policy for deliberation
based on spreading activation. Although quite successful in limited applications,
however, BNs were ultimately unsuited for scaling to open-ended domains, and
for supporting sophisticated forms of reasoning and deliberation. Architectures
with explicit layers of control offer another solution to the same problems, and
are currently very popular thanks to the fact that they couple situated action
with flexible knowledge manipulation. Unlike the BNs, those architectures include
separated layers (typically two), one for reasoning and deliberation, and one for
executing situated action, although the design of such layers vary. Like BNs, most
layered architectures deal with the problem of communication between the two
layers by using a homogeneous representation format, such as fuzzy logic, among
layers (Bonarini et al. 2003, Pezzulo et al. 2005, Saffiotti and Wasik 2003). Although
these systems have planning capabilities, they typically do not support sophisti-
cated forms of reasoning and deliberation. One notable exception is described in
(Parsons et al. 2000): an early attempt to hybridize a layered robot architecture
with the BDI (belief, desire, intention) architecture for practical reasoning (Rao
and Georgeff 1995), the former operating on sensory data and providing lower level
navigation capabilities, and the latter operating on symbolic data and supporting
deliberation and means-ends reasoning. Other examples of layered agent architec-
tures are HMOSAIC (Haruno et al. 2003) and HAMMER (Demiris and Khadhouri
2005), whose layers include actions and plans specified at multiple, increasingly
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abstract levels, and a homogeneous action or plan selection mechanism. These sys-
tems, however, put even less emphasis on higher level cognitive processing.
1.1. Aims and structure of the paper
The aim of this paper is to present an agent architecture, DiPRA (Distributed
Practical Reasoning Architecture), which couples realistic embodiment with mech-
anisms of intentional action control that are more sophisticated than those offered
by most robotic systems. DiPRA is a two-layer architecture. Higher level cognitive
operations are realized in the intentional layer, whose design is inspired by Brat-
man et al.’s (1988) idea of practical reasoning, that is, a reasoning process that
determines what one is to do, and steers action. Specifically, the higher layer real-
izes deliberation (i.e., the process of deciding what to do) and means-ends reasoning
(i.e., the process of deciding how to do it), which jointly permit the selection of and
planning of distal goals, or those not dictated by immediate affordances (Gibson
1979) in the environment. Moreover, it naturally implements replanning (changing
plan to achieve the same goal), intention reconsideration (changing the intended
goal), and commitment to intentions (pursuing intentions in the face of changing
contextual conditions), which are fundamental abilities of practical reasoning sys-
tems. DiPRA includes also a sensorimotor layer composed of multiple sensorimotor
schemas, roughly the equivalent of Norman and Shallice’s (1986) schemas. The sen-
sorimotor layer is responsible for situated action in open-ended environments and,
as we will discuss, is essential for ensuring grounding of knowledge manipulated at
the higher layer.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows: sec. 2 offers a conceptual analysis
of the main challenges faced in designing multilevel control architectures, and how
DiPRA’s design takes them into account. Sec. 3 describes the DiPRA architecture,
and sec. 4 illustrates the implementation of a DiPRA agent: a simulated robot
(with realistic embodiment) that plays the role of a ‘thief’ in a guards-and-thieves
scenario. Specifically, in an artificial ‘house’ (a 3D realistic virtual environment)
with two floors and nineteen rooms, the thief has to locate and steal a ‘treasure’
and at the same time escape from one or more ‘guards’; see fig. 6. Two experiments
are described in sec. 4 which demonstrate DiPRA’s ability to balance among levels
of control and to acquire grounded knowledge which is then used to guide further
reasoning and deliberation. Then, in sec. 5 we discuss the solutions we adopted in
the design of DiPRA in the light of experimental results, and in sec. 6 we draw our
conclusions.
2. Willed and automatic control of action: challenges and possible solutions
A schematic illustration of a generic layered architecture, which integrates willed
and automatic levels of control, is provided in fig. 1.
In the lower layer (automatic control) actions are selected and executed whose
outcomes satisfy the agent’s active drives by exploiting current affordances in the
environment or producing novel ones to be exploited successively. At the same
time, sensory feedback is used for triggering further action selection as well as for
action control. This process is sufficient for an automatic selection of action and
the satisfaction of a basic repertoire of drives. The higher layer (willed control) is
instead responsible for intentional action. Here a (practical) reasoning process is
responsible for selecting the most adequate plan on the basis of active goals, back-
ground information, and novel knowledge (which is continuously extracted from
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Figure 1. Interactions among processes in a sample layered architecture. Full edges represent passage of
information: goals and knowledge carry on information about plans/actions ‘desirability’ and ‘achievability’
respectively. Sensory feedback is used for knowledge extraction (and revision) as well as in the selection
and control of action. Empty edges represent a bias on selection processes (drives and current affordances
influence goal and action selection, plans influence action selection). Dotted edges represent indirect effects:
actions produce outcomes in the environment, which in turn can satisfy drives and achieve goals.
the environment). Planned courses of action are then executed that achieve the
agent’s goals—in most architectures this is done by reusing the same ‘machinery’
that supports automatic action.
Most of the layered architectures above described are (partially or totally) com-
pliant with this basic architectural scheme, although of course the details of their
implementation differ; for example, contention scheduling is just one of the pos-
sible realizations of action/schema selection. More important for our conceptual
analysis is the fact that designers of layered architectures face another difficulty:
ensuring the integration of components and processes in the two layers. As we
have seen, some layered architectures adopt different representational formats in
the two layers, which makes communication between them problematic and po-
tentially prone to computational bottlenecks. This is not the main obstacle to
integration, however. In the rest of this section we analyze the three main chal-
lenges of multilevel control of action: integration of levels of control, management of
perceptual/attentional strategies, and knowledge extraction and grounding. Then,
we briefly introduce DiPRA’s design solutions to tackle those problems.
2.1. Integration of levels of control
One problem that arises in the realization of architectures with multiple levels
of control is how to manage their dependencies and possible conflicts. For exam-
ple, how to balance automatic action selection processes and deliberate planning
processes, which have different sources (stimulus-driven vs. goal-driven), operate
on different time scales, and possibly rely on different representations and aim to
achieve proximal or distal objectives. Too much top-down, goal-directed control
makes the agent not opportunistic and unable to react promptly, while too much
bottom-up, stimuli-driven control makes the agent reactive and unable to achieve
distal goals, or those that are not dictated by current environmental affordances.
Ideally, an intentional agent should be able to remain committed to its inten-
tions without losing situatedness and opportunism. However, this raises several
questions: how much reasoning should be performed before acting? How specified
February 16, 2009 13:59 Connection Science pezzulo-cs
Connection Science 5
should plans be, and how much should be left to on-line action control? How is it
possible to be committed to the intended goal and plan, and at the same time to
remain responsive to unexpected, potentially dangerous events which demand for
an immediate reaction? It is easy to understand that all these problems are not
simply solved by sharing a common representational format across layers, but it is
necessary to ensure that they interact efficaciously and with coordinated timing.
2.2. Managing perceptual and attentional processes
There is a conflict between goal-directed and stimulus-driven processes, not only in
the selection and control of action, but also in the guidance of perceptual and atten-
tional strategies. Reactive agent architectures are typically designed, instructed or
evolved to select stimuli from their environments that are relevant for their current
action. In fig. 1 this is evident in the loop between action execution and sensory
feedback. The former produces the latter, and the latter influences further action
selection and control. In other words, actions are executed that unravel salient
stimuli events, which in turn trigger further actions, and so on.
In intentional agent architectures this is not sufficient, however, since representing
the current context is not enough. Recent research in neuroscience has shown that
knowledge of future states, and in particular action outcomes and goals, is a crucial
part of the cognitive representation that underlies action preparation (Jeannerod
1997), the ‘covert’ part of action execution. As a consequence, it is often necessary
to direct attention to future states of affairs (e.g., obstacles in a trajectory), and to
actively search for goal-related stimuli (Land 2006). Moreover, deliberative agents
need information not only for acting here and now, but also for deciding what goal
to achieve or which plan to follow; for instance, they (often) need to know what
goal or plan preconditions are currently available. Overall, intentional agents need
a multiplicity of anticipatory attentional and information-seeking strategies which
can potentially conflict with the demands of situated action, and it is necessary to
ensure that when they pay attention to distal events they do not disregard proximal
ones.
2.3. Knowledge extraction and grounding
A related problem is that in most cases information required for making deci-
sions and taking future action cannot simply be extracted from the perceptual
environment and used on-line with action, but must be internally represented and
maintained. In this vein, most layered or practical reasoning systems such as BDI
explicitly represent and manipulate semantic knowledge in their higher layers (see
the edge labeled ‘knowledge extraction’ in fig. 1). This poses yet another problem,
however, that of guaranteeing the quality of such knowledge.
It has recently become evident in the cognitive science community that one cen-
tral issue in the design of knowledge-based systems is the so-called symbol grounding
problem (Harnad 1990), that is how representations of natural and artificial organ-
isms acquire reference and aboutness1. In other terms, it is important to guarantee
that conceptual knowledge manipulated at the higher layer (either acquired au-
1This is reminiscent of the problem of intentionality (Brentano 1985): how an organism’s representations
and knowledge are “of” or “about”. Note that here ‘intention’ is meant in the technical sense of ‘aboutness’,
or the characteristic of representations or mental states ‘to be about something other’, not in the sense of
intentional, goal-directed action. Similarly, Coradeschi and Saffiotti (2003) proposed the anchoring problem,
that is how to assess the truth value of symbols explicitly manipulated on the basis of the current state of
the sensors.
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tomatically or manually inserted) refers appropriately to the world so that it can
be used by the agent as a basis for decision and action. Several approaches have
been proposed for finding adequate ‘correspondence rules’ to map knowledge in
the two layers. For example, Harnad (1990) proposes a sensorimotor solution to
the grounding problem, which consists in deriving (conceptual) entities belonging
to the intentional level, including beliefs, from states of the sensors (often clus-
terized with statistical or similar techniques). This approach is based on the idea
that conceptual entities are caused by perceptual states, thus the former should be
grounded in the latter. However, it is unclear how to ground beliefs such as expecta-
tions or abstract concepts, which cannot be simply inferred from the current state
of the sensors. Other authors propose instead the idea of a ‘loop’ between external
observations and internal knowledge revision processes in which the prediction of
external events is a key component (Bouguerra et al. 2007, Pezzulo 2008a, Roy
2005)—an approach we will elaborate in this paper.
Providing an agent with knowledge leads to a number of additional problems.
The first is related to the amount and relevance of knowledge that is internally ma-
nipulated. Although for most cognitive tasks artificial systems need to acquire and
manipulate knowledge, it is unnecessary—and impossible—for them to internal-
ize a complete explicit representation of the world (Clark 1998). Even if this were
possible, they can use only a part of such knowledge, since they have bounded
resources. Intuitively, only the relevant part of information has to be considered.
Unfortunately, the well-known frame problem, originally proposed by McCarthy
and Hayes (1969), indicates that it is extremely difficult for an artificial system
to determine which part of its knowledge is relevant given its current context and
goals. Furthermore, it is worth noting that for reasoning and deliberation processes
it is useful to exploit knowledge about both present and future state of affairs. In
order to be ‘attuned’ to the current situation or, in short, situated, an agent must
be able to process knowledge that is up-to-date and acquired at the right time,
otherwise it is useless or maladaptive, as pointed out by Brooks (1991) in his criti-
cism of representation-based AI. Moreover, to take intentional action an agent has
to know which of its possible actions are more likely to produce effects that will
eventually achieve its goals. Although some means-ends relations are stable, it is
often the case that the same action can produce different effects under different
circumstances, so knowledge of action effects needs to be contextualized. Overall,
this means that any knowledge-provided AI system has to continuously ensure
the grounding and relevance of several kinds of knowledge, including the present
state of affairs and the possible outcomes of its actions; otherwise its deliberative
processes will be maladaptive.
2.4. DiPRA’s design principles
To tackle the aforementioned problems of integration of levels of control, man-
agement of perceptual and attentional processes, and knowledge extraction and
grounding, in the design of DiPRA we introduced four key design principles, which
we briefly introduce here.
2.4.1. Division of labour between off-line planning and on-line action
We have discussed how goal-directed action aims at realizing distal (desired) ef-
fects. However, in order to execute any voluntary action it is necessary to specify
not only its goal but also the details of its execution. Since details vary depending
on contextual conditions, they cannot be part of the goal specification, but must
be filled in (or at least updated) later on. To do so, it has been proposed in the psy-
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chological and neuroscientific literature on planning and motor control that there
is a division of labour between off-line planning and on-line specification (Hommel
et al. 2001, Jeannerod 1997). This makes it possible to translate intentions into
actual action, and at the same time to remain responsive to opportunities from the
environment. To account for such division of labour, in DiPRA planned behavior is
realized by the same sensorimotor schemas which subserve automatic action. Plans
consist in the specification and activation of sequences of sensorimotor schemas,
which are themselves responsible for on-line action specification, monitoring and
fine-tuning; this means that environmental cues cause automatic adjustments and
in some cases deviations from the planned courses of action.
2.4.2. Regulation of epistemic processes with a loop between the two layers
DiPRA’s attentional and epistemic dynamics are regulated by a continuous loop
between the two layers, bottom-up (from the sensorimotor to the intentional layer)
and top-down (vice-versa). Bottom-up processes permit the acquisition of grounded
and up-to-date knowledge, and the translation of current action opportunities into
knowledge to reason about. This is realized thanks to a continuous self-monitoring
process: beliefs monitor the activity level of schemas, and knowledge is revised and
updated when the sensorimotor context changes. At the same time, top-down, pre-
dictive processes can trigger epistemic actions, that is actions which aim to acquire
information from the environment (Kirsh and Maglio 1994). Some examples include
a shift in attention or mental simulations of possible actions (Jeannerod and De-
cety 1995); these strategies allow to check plans and actions preconditions, or to
forecast their effects. Overall, we will argue, this attentional and epistemic loop
permits agents to obtain knowledge both grounded in the current (or simulated)
sensorimotor interaction and relevant for the agent’s goals. Essentially in DiPRA
it is the grounding and relevance of knowledge, and not a homogeneous representa-
tional format, that permits layers integration despite their different demands and
time scales.
2.4.3. Bounded resources allocation
Another important aspect of DiPRA is that the selection of goals, plans and
schemas is regulated by a uniform mechanism that allocates bounded (compu-
tational and knowledge) resources on the basis of an (implicit) estimate of how
reliably they can carry out their expected results—their achievability—and the de-
sirability of such results. Inspiration for such mechanism comes from two sources.
First, the biological literature suggests that decision and action selection are com-
petitive processes (Prescott et al. 1999) based on a comparison of expected action
outcomes (proximal and distal), and their value for the organism. Accordingly, in
DiPRA the current motivational context, i.e. the value of active drives and goals,
is responsible for the desirability dimension of selection: highly-valued drives and
goals influence action by activating action schemas or plans respectively. Second,
an authoritative view in motor control indicates that (sensory) prediction is the
key mechanism for selection (Wolpert and Ghahramani 2004), since it provides a
context-sensitive measure of the achievability of actions. Accordingly, in DiPRA
a mechanism that favors goals, plans and actions whose predictions are correct is
adopted in both layers to account for the achievability dimension of selection:
• Schemas in the sensorimotor layer compete on the basis of their prediction
accuracy, that is, on the basis of how reliably they are expected to carry out
their desired results in the current sensorimotor context.
• Similar to how action schemas compete on the basis of how much support
they get from (predicted) sensory stimuli, goals and plans in the intentional
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layer compete on the basis of how much support they get from (predicted) be-
liefs. Since beliefs are grounded in sensorimotor expectations, goals and plan
ultimately compete on the basis of how reliably they are expected to realize
desired outcomes through action.
The same mechanism of (bounded) resources allocation regulates how much pri-
ority is given to reasoning or sensorimotor processes and the shifting of levels of
control (intentional vs. automatic) due to contextual conditions.
2.4.4. Realization of reasoning and deliberation as intertwined processes
Finally, unlike traditional models of practical reasoning such as BDI, in DiPRA
means-ends reasoning and deliberation are intertwined processes. Means-ends
chains for multiple candidate goals can be constructed in parallel that trigger the
unraveling of novel information and feedback on the goal selection process when
their achievability is assessed or novel (positive or negative) side-effects are taken
into account. This is consistent with recent evidence indicating that the planning
and specification of multiple possible courses of action and their selection occur
concomitantly at the neural level as a competitive race (Cisek 2007, Cisek and
Kalaska 2005). In order to avoid a combinatorial explosion, an incremental mech-
anism (based again on bounded resources) ensures a parsimonious exploration of
the most promising means-ends chains first.
3. DiPRA: Distributed Practical Reasoning Architecture
DiPRA (Distributed Practical Reasoning Architecture) is a two-layer architecture;
see fig 2. It includes an intentional layer performing practical reasoning (Bratman
et al. 1988): selecting the current intention by choosing among multiple goals and
sub-goals (such as ‘search the treasure’ or ‘reach room 11’) on the basis of cur-
rent beliefs, and selecting a plan to adopt for the purpose of realizing the current
intention. It also includes a sensorimotor layer, which provides interactive, situ-
ated capabilities by means of specialized schemas, each realizing an action (such
as ‘grab the treasure’ or ‘avoid obstacle’), each having a variable activity level, and
each including an anticipatory mechanism (internal forward model, see Wolpert
and Kawato 1998) permitting to predict the effects of its actions, actual or poten-
tial1.
The two layers of DiPRA, higher and lower (above and below the dotted line in
fig. 2), are seamlessly integrated and interact in two ways. First, plans belonging to
the intentional layer can trigger sequences of schemas belonging to the sensorimotor
layer (see the downward arrow in fig. 2). Moreover, knowledge manipulated in the
intentional layer (e.g., a belief) is obtained by monitoring the activity level of
schemas at the sensorimotor layer (see the upward arrow in fig. 2). For example,
when the activity level of a schema for passing through doors is high (that is,
when its accuracy in prediction is high), the belief ‘the door is open’ is derived.
In the intentional level, beliefs can be obtained and manipulated not only when
concerning the current sensorimotor context, but also about future expectations. In
order to produce such expectations, schemas can be re-enacted ‘in simulation’, that
is by chaining their predictions to produce long-term predictions for an arbitrary
number of steps in the future. For example, the belief ‘the door is open’ can be
1All DiPRA components should be interpreted as belonging to a functional level of description, which
is the typical level of schema-based architectures (Arbib 1992), and no attempt is done here to identify
putative brain mechanisms or their anatomic equivalents (but see Wolpert et al. 1998 for a discussion of
the brain substrate of forward and inverse models in sensorimotor schemas).
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Figure 2. The sensorimotor layer (below the horizontal, dotted line), the intentional layer (above), and
their interactions. For the sake of simplicity, in the intentional layer we show only the reasoner (FCM). In
the sensorimotor layes we show four sets of schemas, the camera and wheels controllers, and the drives.
The circles filled with a ‘F’ indicate that motor commands of schemas to the two actuators are gated.
Edges between schemas and drives indicate Hebbian links (excitatory or inhibitory). The downward arrow
which crosses the horizontal, dotted line indicates top-down control: a plan which activates schemas for
reaching room 11 (the goal) by traversing rooms 7, 8, 9, and 10 (see fig. 6 for the house map). The upward
arrow which crosses the horizontal, dotted line indicates that a belief (guard in sight) is grounded in the
activity level of one or more schemas responsible for guards escape.
produced even if the agent is not passing the door, but (from a certain distance)
simulates passing through it and the simulation runs successfully (if unsuccessful,
the belief ‘the door is closed’ can be produced instead). This means that the belief
‘the door is open’ corresponds to an agent’s expectation that if it tries to pass
through the door, its attempt will succeed.
3.1. An overview of the architecture
DiPRA is a modular and parallel system comprising several components. The com-
ponents of the intentional layer are: the Reasoner, Goals, Plans, Beliefs, and Ac-
tions. The component of the sensorimotor layer are the Schemas. Each component
is implemented as a concurrent module in the multi-thread framework AKIRA
(www.akira-project.org). Each module has an arbitrary content and a variable ac-
tivity level determining its computational resources: its thread’s priority, that in
turn determines speed of execution and priority over sensors and actuators. An-
other relevant feature, that is essential for understanding DiPRA’s resources and
knowledge boundedness, is that all modules share (and compete for) limited com-
putational resources, stored in a component called the energy pool. At the beginning
of each cycle, modules receive activation only if this is effectively available in the
energy pool, otherwise they have to wait. This means that only some modules can
be active at the same time. Finally, modules can communicate by exchanging sym-
bolic messages (via a blackboard) or by exchanging activation (see Pezzulo and
Calvi 2007a for details).
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Before describing DiPRA’s components, here we sketch its functioning. In the
intentional layer (above the dotted line in fig. 2) each Belief, Goal, Action and Plan
is a module operating asynchronously with variable activity levels (see later) and is
connected to other modules (such as: Belief β supports Goal γ). A special module,
the Reasoner, maintains a consistent representation of the modules’ activity level
and their relations by using a Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM) (Kosko 1986). As long
as the agent acts or reasons new beliefs are added to the intentional layer. The
main roles of the Reasoner are selecting one Intention among the alternative goals,
adopting a suitable plan for achieving it, and finally activating actions. Consistently
with the idea of practical reasoning, this is done on the basis of current beliefs (see
Castelfranchi 1996).
Actions are then realized by specialized modules (schemas, e.g., ‘escape from
guard’, ‘avoid obstacle’) that belong to the sensorimotor layer (below the dotted
line in fig. 2). Schemas compete to send commands to the two actuators (camera
and wheel controllers), and their activity level controls the ‘gating’ of their motor
commands. A schema’s activity level increases under three conditions: (1) when the
schema receives activation for plans (top-down way), (2) when the schema receives
activation from active drives, and (3) when the schema’s forward model generates
accurate predictions, indicating that it is appropriate to the current sensorimotor
context (bottom-up way). For example, the schema ‘detect guard’ raises its activity
level when it successfully predicts sensory evidence of a guard.
At the same time, schemas’ activity level determine the values of beliefs and
other declarative components in the Reasoner: the activity level of schemas and
their success or unsuccess are routinely checked by the corresponding declarative
components of the intentional layer, such as plan conditions or other beliefs, which
then update their values (and activity level) in the FCM1. For instance, a Belief (e.g.
‘door is open’) can be verified by the success of a schema (e.g., ‘pass door’). Beliefs
can also check their truth value by running schemas ‘in simulation’ (e.g., imagining
passing through a door). The agent’s final behavior depends on an interplay of top-
down pressures determined by plans and ‘mental simulations’ (in the intentional
layer) and of bottom-up pressures of schemas which exploit current affordances in
the environment.
As stated above, the whole system has a limited and fixed amount of compu-
tational resources, which means that all active processes compete to stay active.
For example, when the FCM builds complex means-ends chains, it activates more
modules in the intentional layer and as a side-effect the sensorimotor layer has
fewer resources. Another side-effect of the boundedness of resources is that means-
ends chains relative to currently active goals prevent others from being formed
simultaneously—this means that the FCM avoids combinatorial explosion by ex-
ploring the more promising directions first. On the contrary, when events in the
environment happen which demand rapid responses (e.g., dangerous events), the
drives system ensures that more activation is supplied to schemas in the sensorimo-
tor layer. Similarly, action schemas can be prepotentiated by current affordances.
As a consequence, various contextual conditions determine shifts in the levels of
control, intentional or automatic.
1For the sake of simplicity, in the current implementation, there is a 1-to-1 mapping between declarative
components and schemas (e.g., the belief ‘guard in sight’ depends on the activity level of the schema ‘detect
guard’). In principle, however, more complex mappings between an agent’s epistemic states and its actions
can be designed or learned.
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3.2. The intentional layer
The intentional layer includes modules that locally encode goals, plans, actions,
and beliefs. As in the rest of the architecture, modules operate in parallel and
asynchronously, and have a fixed life cycle with a variable amount of computa-
tional resources and speed, depending on their activity level. For example, goals
continuously check their satisfaction, plans check their preconditions and activate
actions, etc. For the sake of simplicity, a consistent representation of the intentional
layer is maintained by a centralized component, the Reasoner.
Here we informally describe the main components of the intentional layer and
their functioning; a formal description is provided in appendix A.
3.2.1. The Reasoner
The Reasoner maintains a consistent representation of the activity of all the
modules and performs deliberation and means-ends analysis using an additive fuzzy
system called FCM (Kosko 1986) whose nodes and edges represent the goals, plans,
beliefs and their links respectively, and in which activation spreads among nodes.
Sample FCM are shown in fig. 2 (above the dotted line), fig. 8 and fig. 9. The
value of each edge is set according to the activity level of the module from which
it originates, representing the impact of a given node over another. For example, if
a belief sustains a goal (a positive link) and the value of the belief module is +0.7,
the edge from the belief to the goal is set to +0.7. Some beliefs play the role of
plan conditions, too, and sustain plans.
The values of nodes in the FCM represent their contextual relevance. The value
of Beliefs (including goals and plan conditions) is fixed; the value of Plans and
Goals is variable and calculated anew (by the FCM) at the beginning of each cycle
of the Reasoner. Goals and plans therefore increase their value and their impact
as long as they are increasingly supported by beliefs, or by other goals and plans.
For example, an achievement goal that is close to satisfaction is likely to be linked
to several supporting beliefs and highly active plans; therefore, its value increases
and it increasingly inhibits the other goals. Overall, agents’ choices are determined
by their beliefs, and intention-to-action hierarchies in the intentional layer lead
to selection of its most appropriate plans and actions. Practical reasoning is then
implemented as a dynamic interplay of means-ends reasoning (that builds causal
chains in the FCM) and deliberation (that exploits them for assigning values to
goals and plans, and then selecting them).
3.2.1.1. Cycle of the Reasoner. As illustrated in fig. 3, all Beliefs routinely check
the activity level of corresponding sensorimotor schemas and update their values
in the FCM; only those having a non-null value are considered. In turn, this leads
to the selection of a plan, which therefore activates a sequence of schemas. Again,
feedback from schemas’ activity further activates other beliefs.
The Reasoner runs concurrently with all other modules. Since it has a fixed
activity level, it can never exceed a certain size. This feature is very useful for
keeping means-ends analysis bounded: at the beginning, only top-level plans are
considered in the FCM, which is filled in with subplans only as new modules become
relevant due to current reasoning or action. Knowledge augments in a bounded way,
too, as long as conditions and Beliefs related to active Plans, Actions and Goals
are checked. The final result of computation in the intentional level is intending a
goal and adopting a plan: the FCM continuously runs and sets the value of nodes.
The most active goal becomes the Intention and the most active plan realizing that
goal becomes the Adopted Plan. Fig. 4 shows that, depending on the current value
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Figure 3. A sample loop between intentional and sensorimotor layers. Phase 1: in the intentional layer,
two plans compete to be selected. Phase 2: a belief which supports Plan 1 monitors the activity level
of its corresponding schema at the sensorimotor layer, getting a positive value and then determining the
selection of Plan 1. Phase 3: Plan 1 in turn activates one sequence of schemas.
of an agent’s beliefs, different goals can win this race and possibly be intended. For
example, in case 1, thanks to the fact that the belief guard in sight has value −1,
the goal have V has value 0.63 and wins, thus being intended. In case 2, instead,
guard in sight has value 1 and as a consequence the goal escape G wins and is
intended.
Figure 4. Different intentions are selected on the basis of different beliefs. In the first case the goal to
collect the valuable is selected (and becomes the new Intention). In the second case the goal to escape the
guard is selected, due to a belief indicating the presence of a guard.
Intention selection has two consequences:
• Intended goals and adopted plans in the FCM receive recurrent connec-
tions, and thus self-reinforcement. This represent the fact the agent is committed
to pursuing its intentions and goals despite slight contingent variations in its
beliefs—a key characteristics of intentional agents (Bratman et al. 1988)1.
• Once a new plan is adopted, it activates sequences of schemas in order to
realize it (see the downward arrow in Fig. 2). This biases the agent’s behavior
in a top-down manner; still, the system remains responsive to stimuli such as
obstacles or novel events that are directly managed at the sensorimotor level.
This division of labour between off-line plan specification and on-line adjustment
allows agents to couple intentionality and responsiveness.
The Reasoner’s cycle has two main tasks: (1) to deliberate (select a goal and a
plan) and (2) to set the activation of the modules. Both are realized through this
cycle:
(1) Set the values of the FCM nodes according to the activity level of the
corresponding modules, and their links.
1Another, weaker form of commitment is implicitly realized by the system dynamics: a goal which is close
to satisfaction inhibits the other goals, thanks to the feedback from plans succeeding and from conditions
that are met.
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(2) Run the FCM and set the nodes value. This value represents the contextual
relevance of the corresponding modules2.
(3) The most active Goal is selected (if over a threshold); if not already
achieved, its status becomes Intended (new intended Goals replace old ones).
Otherwise, another Goal has to be selected. A recurrent connection (hagin
weight θ) is set for the Intended Goal, which gains activation.
(4) The most active Plan for the intended Goal is selected (if over a threshold);
its status becomes Adopted, and its termination conditions are set according to
the intended goal. If there is an already adopted Plan, it is stopped only if its
conditions conflict with those of the new adopted one. A recurrent connection
is set for the Adopted Plan.
(5) If no Plans are possible for the intended Goal, its status becomes Waiting
(and the recurrent connection is maintained); a new Goal has to be intended
until the former becomes achievable (this is unlikely, since the evaluation of a
Goal also depends on how suitable its plans are).
(6) If no goals or plans are over the aforementioned thresholds, said thresholds
lower and the cycle restarts; otherwise, modules’ activity level are set accord-
ing to the values of corresponding nodes in the FCM. As a consequence, the
Reasoner resets the modules’ activity level only when a new Plan is adopted.
3.2.2. Beliefs, Conditions and Goals
For the sake of simplicity, we chose to use a uniform representational format for
all declarative components: fuzzy logic (Kosko 1986, Zadeh 1965). All conditions
(goal conditions, pre and post conditions of plans and actions, etc.) are special
kinds of beliefs. For example, a Belief (“room 11 is far”) can be matched using
fuzzy rules with the Precondition of a Plan (“room 11 is close”) to generate a
graded truth value. Goal conditions also share this formalism; in this way they can
be matched e.g. against postconditions in order to verify their satisfaction (e.g. the
Goal “go to room 11” becomes more and more satisfied when the truth value of
“room 11 is close” increases). There are separate policies for achieve and maintain
goals. In Achievement goals (e.g., “reach room 11”), contextual relevance increases
when the truth value of the goal postcondition increases. In Maintain goals (e.g.,
“stay close to room 11”), contextual relevance lowers when the truth value of the
goal postcondition increases.
3.2.3. Plans
Plans are the main control structures in DiPRA. Plans are activated for satisfying
an intended goal; once the plan is adopted, a subset of their postconditions is set
as Goal. A Plan is basically an execution scheme, activating Actions and Goals
from the ActionSet and subgoaling. This is their behavior:
• If the intended Goal is already achieved, the Plan stops immediately and no
action is executed.
• If any plan precondition is false, the Plan ‘delegates’ its satisfaction to other
modules by passing activation to them; subgoals activated in this way gain the
status of Instrumental.
• If all preconditions are met, the Plan starts executing its sequence of actions,
or activating subgoals; therefore, (sub)goals activate (sub)plans or actions, and
so on. Goals activated in this way also gain the status of Instrumental.
2Goals, plans, actions and beliefs can also be more or less relevant in absolute. This is represented by the
AbsRel value, which is also the value of a recurrent connection of the corresponding FCM node (not shown
in Fig. 6).
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• Plans continue subgoaling and executing until all possible actions and sub-
goals fail. A failed plan returns control to the calling goal, which remains not
satisfied and activates another plan. However, very often unsuccessful plans are
stopped before exhausting all possibilities. If several conditions of a plan fail, the
corresponding ‘branch’ in the FCM is doomed to weaken despite commitment,
and other plans can replace it.
3.2.4. Actions
An Action is the minimal operation which is executable by plans. In the current
DiPRA implementation, each action simply corresponds to one schema in the sen-
sorimotor layer: plans activate sequences of actions by transferring activation to
the corresponding schemas.
3.3. The sensorimotor layer
Like most schema-based systems (Arbib 1992), the sensorimotor layer includes
several sets of sensorimotor schemas, each specialized for a basic behavior: naviga-
tion, treasure finding and grabbing, guards recognition and escape, and obstacle
avoidance (see fig. 2, below the dotted line). For each behavior there are several
schemas, each specialized for a sub-context, which cooperate and compete for con-
trol of the agent’s actuators. For example, schemas for navigation are specialized
to know and operate in a portion of the environment.
The sensorimotor layer includes drives, as well, which play the role of basic mo-
tivational components of the architecture (Hull 1943) as opposed to more complex
motivations such as goals, which belong to the intentional layer.
3.3.1. Schemas implementation
We designed schemas of two main kinds: perceptual schemas and motor schemas.
Perceptual schemas (e.g., detect treasure and detect guard) control the vision of the
agent by moving a camera (the only sensor). Motor schemas (e.g., catch treasure
and escape guard) receive sensory input from related perceptual schemas (e.g.,
escape guard from detect guard) and control the movements of the agent by moving
its wheels. Moreover, each perceptual schema sends sensory information to one
(predefined) set of motor schemas. Typically several schemas are active, at different
levels, in each situation. For example, if the agent is escaping from a guard, several
schemas specialized for different ways to fulfill this task (e.g. escaping from slow
or quick guards) can be active at once. Moreover, several schemas can be active
for different reasons (e.g., a top-down activation by a plan and a bottom-up guard
detection). Commands of all active schemas are fused, so that the actual agent’s
behavior results from the sum of schemas’ (weighed) contextual pressures.
Fig. 2 (below the dotted line) shows the schemas model used in our experiments.
Each schema is a complete sensorimotor unit: it includes specific (neural) circuits
for processing stimuli and generating motor commands (inverse model) coupled
with a predictive component for generating sensory predictions (forward model),
see (Pezzulo and Calvi 2006, Tani 1996, Wolpert and Kawato 1998). For the sake of
simplicity, in our implementation the inverse and forward modeling functionalities
are integrated in the same neural network, a Jordan-type RNN (Jordan and Rumel-
hart 1992) illustrated in fig. 5 (right), which includes a sensorimotor loop and a
context loop and permits both the control of action (at time t) and the prediction
of its sensory effects (at time t+1). The sensory input node represents three nodes
(encoding positions of object features in the three axis, < x(t), y(t), z(t) >) and
the motor output node represents three nodes (encoding < vx(t), vy(t), vz(t) >,
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i.e., the motor command for reaching < x(t+1), y(t+1), z(t+1) >). See (Pezzulo
2008b, Pezzulo and Calvi 2006) for further details.
Figure 5. Schemas implementation. Each schema is implemented as a Jordan-type RNNs (Jordan and
Rumelhart 1992) that realizes inverse and forward modeling and includes a context loop. See explanation
in the text. It includes 3 sensory inputs S(t), 3 sensory outputs, 3 motor inputs M(t), 3 motor outputs, 2
context inputs C0(t) and C1(t), 2 context outputs, 10 hidden nodes.
3.3.1.1. Generation vs. Simulation. Schemas run in two modes: generation or
simulation. Generation mode is the default. After preprocessing (features extrac-
tion) operated by hand-coded routines (see Pezzulo and Calvi 2006) the RNN
receives the estimated position < x(t), y(t), z(t) > of the feature it is specialized
to deal with (e.g., a red shape) with from the camera (in the case of percep-
tual schemas) or a perceptual schema (in the case of motor schemas), produces
a motor command < vx(t), vy(t), vz(t) > and sends it to the camera (or wheels)
controller. The RNN also receives an efference copy of the final motor command
executed by the camera (or wheels) controller and generates the sensory prediction
< xp(t+ 1), yp(t+ 1), zp(t+ 1) >.
Any schema can run off-line in simulation mode, too, for predicting the long-term
sensory consequences of its motor commands: this is a form of mental simulation of
action (Jeannerod 2001). In this case its motor commands are inhibited (not sent
to the actuators), but fed as sensory inputs to the forward model. It then produces
new sensory predictions that are used by the inverse model for generating a new
motor command ‘as if’ the agent actually sensed the predicted future. The loop
between forward and inverse models allows the generation of long-term predictions
for an arbitrary number of future steps, such as in imagery. The simulation mode
is used in the experiments in sec. 4 for producing beliefs about possible future
actions1.
3.3.1.2. Schema Activity Level. Several schemas can be active at once. Each
schema executes its operations asynchronously and with different speed, depend-
ing on its current activity level (calculated anew at the beginning of each cy-
cle). More active schemas receive more up-to-date sensory information, and send
motor commands with higher firing rate. Activity level is calculated as follows:
rel+ links+ plan (normalized in [0,1]) if this sum is larger than pool, otherwise to
pool, where:
1In the current implementation only navigation schemas can run in simulation. However, the same method-
ology has been used in related studies (Pezzulo 2008b) for the realization of more complex forms of imagery.
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• rel indicates how much the schema is expected to be successful in the current
context; in our model (like in Wolpert and Kawato 1998) this depends on its
prediction accuracy : position sensed and predicted (by the forward model) are
compared, and rel is set to (1−|| < x(t), y(t), z(t) > − < xp(t), yp(t), zp(t) > ||).
• links is a contextual parameter that depends on the activity level of other
schemas and drives (see below).
• plan is activation received by plan units (top-down influences);
• pool is the amount of resources currently available in the limited pool.
Each schema has a reliability value, which depends on its accuracy in prediction:
schemas that predict better are considered to be ‘well attuned’ to the current
situation and thus reliable. On the basis of reliability, the activity level of (the
module corresponding to) each schema is assigned: position sensed and predicted
(by the forward model) are compared, and rel is set to (1 − || < x(t), y(t), z(t) >
− < xp(t), yp(t), zp(t) > ||). More active schemas send more frequently motor
commands to the motor wheels and camera, and therefore influence both pragmatic
(where to go) and epistemic one (which stimuli are attended to) activities. The
schemas’ activity level can also be raised by drives, or by plan units belonging to
the intentional layer.
Each schema has a threshold thr (set to 0.3 in our simulations). If act < thr the
schema functions normally but its motor commands to the actuator are inhibited.
(See Pezzulo and Calvi 2007b for a more detailed specification of the parameters.)
3.3.2. Implementation of drives
The sensorimotor layer includes also two internal, motivational states, fear and
hunger, modeled as simple homeostatic variables whose satisfaction is a primary
source of behavior (Hull 1943). Hunger is raised (by 0.1 every 10 cycles) by a
‘biological clock’, and is set to 0 when the treasure is grabbed. Fear is set to 1
when a guard is detected, and decreases (by 0.1 every 5 cycles) otherwise. This
introduces a slight bias toward potentially dangerous events in the environment,
which is reasonable in open-ended environments. However, as described above,
fear and hunger develop associative links with schemas via Hebbian learning, so
their values are updated depending on contextual conditions. Their main roles
are steering behavior (by activating schemas for escaping guards and reaching
the treasure respectively when the context is appropriate), and creating positive
feedback and persistence (i.e., hysteresis). A Fuzzy Cognitive Map (FCM) (Kosko
1992), a hybrid neural network - fuzzy system, is used for calculating the drives’
activity level (in [0,1]): fear and hunger are modeled as two nodes in the FCM and
have mutually inhibitory links set to -0.6.
4. The Guards and Thieves Scenario
We tested DiPRA’s efficacy in two experiments in a guards-and-thieves scenario,
with the DiPRA architecture playing the role of the thief. The environment is
a 3D simulated house with 2 floors and 19 rooms (including 2 stairways) whose
positions vary between -10000 and +10000 in the three axes. In the house are
both a guard and a thief ; see fig. 6. Guard and Thief have the same size and
speed, and a limited range of vision (an angle of 90 ◦). The use of the Irrlicht 3D
simulation engine (irrlicht.sourceforge.net), with its realistic physics based on ODE
(www.ode.org), ensures that agents embodiment (although simplified with respect
to most robotic platforms) is appropriate for our objectives.
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Figure 6. (i) 2D Map of the simulated scenario, representing a two-floor house. The second floor can be
reached by stairs. (ii) Snapshot of room 1: a guard and the treasure (the box).
4.1. Experimental setup
In both experiments the guard G is modeled as a simple schema-based system with
2 drives, to protect the valuable (V ) and to catch the thief (T ) and a repertoire
of 4 schemas (2 perceptual and 2 motor) for satisfying these drives. Drives and
schemas are encoded by hand and there is no learning; overall, the capabilities of
the guard are comparable to those of most bots (i.e., computer controlled players
or opponents) in computer games.
We are instead interested in evaluating the capabilities of the DiPRA layered
architecture introduced in this paper. For doing so, in Experiment 1 we compare
the architecture of two thief types: the thief architecture TI, which is a full fledged
DiPRA implementation (see fig. 2), and the simplest thief architecture TS, which
has the same sensorimotor layer as TI but a simplified intentional layer. In Exper-
iment 2 we compare instead the thief TI with alternative agent architectures.
4.1.1. Encoding of the Intentional Layer of the thief TI
The thief (TI) is the one shown in fig. 2. It is provided with an intentional
layer, consisting of 2 goals (collect valuable (V ) and escape guard (G)) and 21
plans for realizing them. The initial values of the 2 goals of TI are set by hand:
escape G is 0.7 and collect V is 0.5, reflecting the fact that when both goals are
achievable the former should have priority. The whole FCM of TI (see examples in
Figs. 2, 4, 8 and 9) was designed by hand, reflecting the fact that it already knows
the map of the environment and in particular how to reach each room (we have
empirically estimated that 21 plans, which can be merged and chained, are sufficient
to ensure good navigation capabilities in the house). Associations between plans
and schemas in the sensorimotor layer are set up by hand, too. Although machine
learning techniques can be used for learning navigation plans autonomously (as
in Pezzulo 2008b), this is outside the scope of this paper. See Appendix A for
parameter specification.
4.1.2. Learning of the Sensorimotor Layer of the thief TI
TI also has a sensorimotor layer that includes a repertoire of 24 schemas (12
perceptual and 12 motor) for realizing actions planned in the intentional layer.
These include navigation schemas for reaching all rooms, as well as for detecting and
escaping the guard, detecting and catching the treasure, and avoiding obstacles (see
fig. 2, below the dotted line). A learning phase is necessary for setting up schemas
reliable enough in forward and inverse modelling, and for coupling schemas and
drives.
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4.1.2.1. Schemas learning. Perceptual and motor schemas for tracking and
reaching (or avoiding) guards, treasure, and obstacles are learned with a super-
vised methodology after features extraction (a facility which is commonly available
in the Irrlicht 3D simulation engine and permits to extract objects size, color,
and shape). Specifically, each schema learns to predict the next sensory position
< xp(t + 1), yp(t + 1), zp(t + 1) > of one feature based on its estimated position
< x(t), y(t), z(t) > and the agent’s last motor command < vx(t), vy(t), vz(t) >. To
do so, during learning treasure and obstacles appear in fixed locations and guards
follow predictable trajectories. Circular and oval trajectories having different am-
plitudes were used. All entities have quite distinguishable features (overlapping
20%) in order to facilitate learning. The RNN of each schema is trained with the
BPTT algorithm Rumelhart et al. (1986). One example (of guard, treasure, or ob-
stacle) was sampled every twelve, with a total of thirty-six; learning stopped when
the error of at least one forward model (the Euclidean distance between the actual
and predicted position in 3D, 0.1 ∗ 10−6) was less than 0,0000001.
The methodology for learning perceptual and motor schemas for navigation is
more complex, since it proved to be impossible to learn accurate schemas for navi-
gating the whole house, or large portions of it. For this reason, we adopted a learn-
ing procedure that permits subgoals (i.e., parts of the map that can be learned
successfully) to be learned individually. The procedure consists in two phases. In
the first phase the agent navigates the entire map (without treasure and guards) at
constant velocity with a wall-following predefined routine (encoded by hand) and
a coupled perceptual-motor schema for obstacle avoidance, and places landmarks
in the environment. For each 10 cycles of the wall-following routine a landmark is
randomly placed in the vicinity of the agent. The landmarks are shown in fig. 7,
left (note that in proximity of obstacles or turns the agent is slower and then it
places more landmarks).
(i) (ii)
Figure 7. (i) Landmarks (crosses) placed in the first phase in the 3D house map. (ii) Movements executed
while learning in the second phase (L start, right, and L goal, left, are in two different rooms). Each
segment is a unitary movement, crosses are landmarks.
In the second phase the agent performs motor babbling for learning to navigate
among landmarks, and its movements are selected or discarded on the basis of
the simulated annealing (SA) algorithm Kirkpatrick et al. (1983). The agent is
placed in a random landmark location (L start). Another landmark (L goal) is
selected randomly with a predefined distance (300 ±υ units, where υ is a learned
parameter). The task is now learning a schema for navigating from L start to L goal
which allows accurate control and sensory prediction. The agent then begins its
motor babbling. The next movement is selected by using the method described in
Marsaglia (1972), which conducts the agent along one of the adjacent locations
by performing a unitary movement in one of the two axes x or y. The simulated
annealing algorithm is used for evaluating if that movement gets the agent closer
to L goal. If this is the case, the agent actually moves there. Otherwise, it executes
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that movement with a probability of eδE/T where δE/T is calculated as current
goal location minus expected goal location, and T is a function of the temperature
parameter of simulated annealing (which decreases for each attempted movement).
If no movement is executed, the next execution cycle of simulated annealing starts.
When the agent reaches L goal, the whole ‘history’ of the movements is stored (a
quadruple: position of the agent, desired position, movement executed, position
reached). Fig. 7 (right) shows the movements executed while learning to navigate
a portion of the environment.
The history is then used as the training set for the navigation schemas (RNNs)
using the BPTT algorithm Rumelhart et al. (1986) (with the same method used
for the other schemas). If a schema does not reach the desired level of accuracy in
prediction it is discarded, the υ parameter is lowered (of 20 units) and the second
phase restarts from the same L start, but a new L goal is selected randomly. If
learning succeeds, the schema is stored (note that stored schemas generalize the
data set and permit navigation in a space that is wider than ‘from L start to
L goal’). Now a new random landmark in a fixed range (10 units) from L goal is
selected as the new L start, a new L goal is choose with the same criterion as before,
and the process restarts. Learning ends when no new L start can be generated that
lies outside any of the already learned schemas. In our simulations 16 schemas were
learned.
4.1.2.2. Integration of schemas. The agent architecture now includes four sets of
schemas learned independently: the challenge is integrating them. For this purpose
the agent (which now includes all schemas) navigates again in the environment in
which two guards dwell in fixed locations. All schemas are active but their motor
commands are inhibited. The agent is instead controlled by the wall following
routine used in the first learning phase. Schemas do not learn their internal models
any more. Instead, energetic links among all the schemas and drives are learned
with the following Hebb rule Hebb (1949): ∆Wji = ηaiaj , where η is the learning
rate (set to 0.2) and ai, aj represent the activations of two schemas, or a schema
and a drive (normalization is applied at each cycle). This means that schemas and
drives which are active in the same span of time develop associative links (e.g.,
fear with schemas for avoiding guards). The associative topology of the network
implicitly encode possible trajectories or location/drive associations.
4.1.3. Description of the thief TS
The thief (TS) has the same sensorimotor layer as TI. Its intentional layer in-
cludes only the two aforementioned goals (collect V and escape G), which are
directly linked to schemas (more precisely, to the same schemas indicated in the
corresponding plans of TI) and fuel them. Overall, TS has a simplified intentional
layer that cannot support practical reasoning.
4.2. Experiment 1
In Experiment 1 the performance of TI and TS are compared. The experiment
serves to assess the effectiveness of the complete (layered) DiPRA architecture in
real-word, dynamic scenarios (a hard challenge for most knowledge-based AI sys-
tems) as compared to a simpler, one-layer architecture. To make the comparison
meaningful, we provided TS and TI with the same amount of computational re-
sources in the energy pool. Since TI’s resources are split among the intentional
and sensorimotor layers, while TS has only the sensorimotor layer, the extra layer
comes at the cost of less reactivity. In particular, in order to be advantageous the
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intentional layer has to interact efficaciously with the sensorimotor one. Therefore,
an advantage of the layered architecture TI will indirectly show that the method-
ologies we adopted for obtaining knowledge and for activating schemas based on
adopted plans (the two ways which the layers have to interact) are efficacious, too.
Table 1. Comparison between TI and TS (see text for explanation)
Thief V collected (%) time (secs.)
TS (without intentions) 61% 154.3
TI (with intentions) 76% 78.1
We have compared the performance of two thieves TI and TS, operating individ-
ually in 100 simulations. The task consists in collecting V without being captured
by G. The thief, the guard and the valuable appeared randomly in the house, and
the simulation ended with either the valuable collected by the thief, or the thief
captured by the guard. As illustrated in Tab 1, TI performs significantly better
than TS both with respect to (average) percentage of collected valuables and (aver-
age) time for successfully achieving the task (p < 0, 001 in both cases with analysis
of variance, ANOVA). All this happens despite the fact that reasoning in the in-
tentional level wastes computational resources (the exact amount varies during the
experiments, depending on the number of nodes in the FCM). This indicates that
TI’s knowledge is sufficiently good to provide it better adaptivity with respect to
its opponent TS.
4.3. Experiment 2
In order to provide a better measure of DiPRA’s effectiveness, we have also com-
pared it with other popular architectures. Four implementations of the Thief were
tested: (1) TI (described previously); (2) the A* algorithm (Hart et al. 1968) (which
has full knowledge of the environment, including the location of V and Gs, plans
the shortest path to it but and replans when something changes in the environ-
ment, e.g. a door closes); (3) a classic BDI (based on Rao and Georgeff 1995), with
the same goals, plans and beliefs of DiPRA. Finally, a baseline (random system)
is compared to the other architectures.
Percentage of success (having V without being captured by the Guard) was mea-
sured in 100 runs: analysis of variance (ANOVA) shows that TI (81%) performs
significantly better than the other strategies (p < 0, 0001 in all cases): Baseline
(12%), A* (56%) and BDI (43%). This experiment further illustrates that DiPRA
is able to exploit effectively and flexibly its intentional layer, and to select appro-
priate goals and plans based on grounded knowledge that is produced on-line by
situated action and its prediction.
5. Discussion of the main features of DiPRA
After the DiPRA specification and the above discussed experimental results, in this
section we explain in more detail its main features and design principles sketched
in sec. 1: the division of labour between off-line planning and on-line specification
of action, the grounding of beliefs in sensorimotor interaction and anticipation, the
use of bounded resources and knowledge, and the realization of deliberation and
means-ends reasoning as intertwined processes.
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5.1. Integration of levels of control
In DiPRA there is a division of labour between off-line planning and on-line spec-
ification of action. This means that intentional action is first planned and then
realized by the same mechanisms subserving automatic situated action: that is, by
a prediction-based competition between sensorimotor schemas. Moreover, when en-
vironmental conditions change, belief revision processes determine a variety of be-
havioral responses, which range from revising the priority of schemas, to replanning
and intention reconsideration. The choice to change action, plan or goal determines
completely different responses to the same situation, enhancing DiPRA’s behav-
ioral flexibility. In addition, taking intentional action makes novel beliefs available
in the intentional layer. Overall, the loop between DiPRA’s actions and beliefs,
which are mutually constraining, provides a seamless integration among its two
layers of control.
Figure 8. The intentional layer after replanning. Like in fig. 2, the goal is to reach room 11, but a novel
plan is selected which permits traversing (in sequence) rooms 19, 18, 17, 16, 15, 13 (see fig. 6 for the house
map).
The description of some episodes which occurred in Experiment 1 (TI vs. TS) can
help clarify this point. Suppose that the thief TI is in room 1 and, due to contingent
factors such as the absence of the guard, intends to have V , as in Fig. 4, case1.
Shortly after, a plan is generated for the intention: the reasoner collects the relevant
plans and beliefs, as shown in the FCM above the dotted line in Fig. 2. The resulting
intentional structure is tree-like, involving the plan to find V, the (sub)goal to go to
room 11, the plan to pass through rooms 7-[. . . ]-11. In order to support this means-
ends structure two beliefs are added on as plan preconditions: the expectation that
V is in room 11 and the expectation that the path to room 7 is free. In turn, this
activates corresponding processes of monitoring of the activity level of sensorimotor
schemas with the aim to set and continuously update the values of such beliefs.
Suppose now that, while going to room 7, the detect guard schema succeeds in its
predictions and, as an effect, the thief discovers that the latter expectation was false
(the corresponding node in the FCM is removed), and a new belief guard in sight
is ‘popped in’. As illustrated in Fig 8, a replanning occurs: a new plan, pass rooms
19-[. . . ]-11 is generated for the same intention, go to room 11, since invalidation of
a plan’s precondition still lets the thief committed to the same intention. Once in
room 11, the thief may, however, discover that even the former expectation (V is
in room 11 ) is false, but see (from a balcony permitting a glimpse of room 4) that
V is in room 4. In that case, a failed expectation and new evidence lead to drastic
belief revision in the FCM. As a consequence, there is intention reconsideration,
too: as illustrated in Fig. 9 a new goal, go to room 4, is selected. It is worth noting
that intention reconsideration can occur at different levels: it can modify high-level
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goals, as shown in Fig 4 (case1 vs. case2), or sub-goals, as in this case. These
sample situations illustrate that relevant and situated knowledge, when acquired
at the right time by the agent (as an effect of its reasoning and action), lead to
flexible goal-directed behavior controlled by the intentional layer. While drives are
related to immediate needs and dictate here-and-now actions (related to immediate
stimuli and necessities), goals are based not only on evidences, but on beliefs and
expectations and are thus much more versatile. In particular, the possibility to
predict permits the building of complex plans, which take into consideration future
conditions (such as doors expected to be open or closed). Another very important
advantage is acting (and regulating action) in view of future, and not only present,
opportunities and affordances, and to negotiate present and future opportunities
for actions beyond the possibilities of pure sensorimotor systems. One example is
the possibility to put attention to events which are relative to future parts of the
plan. For example, when following a planned path the agent can control if any of
the doors is open (if they are in sight), not only the next door to enter, since any
closed door invalidates the whole plan.
Although quicker in its sensorimotor interaction, TS is less efficacious in solving
this task. It is unable to plan and it can only exploit the more immediate affordances
in its environment, such as the presence of a guard or the treasure. Moreover, it is
memoryless and thus it risks repeating the same behavior several times even if it
is maladaptive (e.g., attempting the same path 7-[. . . ]-11 even if there is a guard
patrolling it, since once the guard exists the visual field it is no longer considered.
Finally, TS lacks commitment to its goals, so when its environment changes quickly,
it shows oscillating behavior between them.
Figure 9. The intentional level after intention reconsideration. Now a new subgoal (search room 4 instead
of room 11) is selected.
5.1.1. Epistemic processes
As remarked in sec. 1, one complementary aspect of layer integration is the man-
agement of epistemic dynamics, which include perceptual and attentional processes,
as well as the ‘extraction’ of knowledge and beliefs from sensory states. In DiPRA
perceptual and attentional processes are managed by perceptual schemas, which,
like motor schemas, can be activated by current stimuli or plans. Since perceptual
schemas are coupled with motor schemas, the functional integration of action plan-
ning and execution automatically translates to an integrated attentional strategy.
As a consequence, perceptual schemas relative to ongoing and planned actions are
able to direct attention to information relative to the current action or the planned
one, respectively, and their selection depends on the same mechanisms of action
selection. For this reason, no extra mechanism for governing shifts in attention is
needed.
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5.1.2. Grounding beliefs in sensorimotor interaction and anticipation
Another important epistemic process is the retrieval from the environment of
information that is useful for practical reasoning, and in particular for deciding fu-
ture actions, replanning, and intention reconsideration. To be used in deliberation
and means-ends reasoning, such information has to be encoded in declarative for-
mat: as explicit beliefs. In DiPRA beliefs are produced by monitoring sensorimotor
schemas either involved in situated action, or re-enacted in mental simulations.
This is an abductive process (Peirce 1897 / 1940) in that beliefs, like hypotheses,
are tested when relative to the current (or to-be-planned) course of action. Such
verification is based on sensory prediction. For example, the belief the treasure is
at reaching distance can be grounded in a high activity level of the grab treasure
schema, which in turn is determined by its success in (sensory) prediction (e.g.,
the ability to predict specific patterns of sensory inputs which are associated to
guards). The rationale is that an high activity level of a schema is a sign that it
is adequate to the current context, or that its preconditions and expectations are
true; for example, that a treasure is expected to be reachable. Such information
can thus be used for adding or revising beliefs in the FCM. Another example: the
expectation the room in front of me is free can be produced by running ‘in simu-
lation’ the schema go forward (i.e., by chaining several short term predictions to
produce long-term ones, and then ‘virtually exploring’ the room) and monitoring
its expected success or failure.
One important aspect of our methodology is that explicit beliefs have double
nature. First, unlike sensory information, they are persistent epistemic structures
decoupled from any actual situated action, and can trigger different goals in differ-
ent contextual situations. Second, although they are manipulated independently
of situated action, they remain constrained by physical interaction between the
agent and the environment, since they depend on the actual or expected success of
schemas; this guarantees their grounding and intentionality. Another important as-
pect is that objects and events are conceptualized in terms of possibilities of action,
that is different from a mere perceptual understanding or categorization (Pezzulo
2008a). Schemas, indeed, generate predictions about action outcomes, such as ‘if
I go left I will reach the treasure’. This happens both in their normal functioning
and when they are re-enacted ‘in simulation’ to predict future courses of action
and to generate beliefs. In turn, the action-oriented nature of schemas makes them
suitable for taking goal-directed action, and the action-oriented nature of beliefs
makes them suitable for supporting practical reasoning.
Recently the prediction-based approach to representation grounding has begun
to be used for designing robotic systems that aim to bridge the gap between sen-
sorimotor interaction and higher order cognitive skills such as decision making
and language use. A particularly interesting design methodology is offered by Roy
(2005). He describes a schema-based robotic system in which perceptual features
are grounded into sensory information; for example, ‘red’ is grounded in some (ex-
pected) values of the robot’s sensors. More complex attributes are grounded thanks
to (actual and potential) actions: for example, the meaning of ‘sponge’ is grounded
in terms of what actions can be used to operate on it. More precisely, it is the set
of expected consequences of one’s own actions with a sponge (e.g. the anticipated
softness) which constitutes the grounding of the word. Finally, concepts for objects
which are for example reachable or graspable are grounded by schemas that regu-
late actual behavior and, at the same time, encode predictions of the consequences
of (actual or possible) interaction. Based on such grounded knowledge, robots ex-
hibit sophisticated communication and planning capabilities (Mavridis 2006, Roy
2005).
February 16, 2009 13:59 Connection Science pezzulo-cs
24 Giovanni Pezzulo
Other research groups have been exploring the grounding of concepts in sen-
sorimotor interaction. For example, Hoffmann (2007) uses internal simulation of
possible trajectories for grounding concepts related to navigation. In this model,
distance from obstacles is grounded and estimated by running simulations until
they encounter the obstacle. Dead-ends are recognized through simulated obstacle
avoidance, while passages are understood in terms of successfully terminated sim-
ulations of navigation. Other experiments have been conducted that show how to
exploit re-enactment of motor programs and mental simulations for mental state in-
ference (Oztop et al. 2005), imitation (Demiris and Khadhouri 2005), and planning
goal-directed action (Pezzulo 2008b, Tani 1996, Ziemke et al. 2005). The DiPRA
system is conceptually similar to all the models mentioned above. However, in these
systems mental simulations produce implicit knowledge, while in DiPRA schemas’
re-enactment gives rise to (grounded) beliefs that are explicitly represented in a
declarative format in the intentional layer. Based on such explicit representations,
flexible forms of internal manipulation can be realized, such as deliberation and
means-ends analysis, without violating situatedness and thus ensuring layer inte-
gration.
5.1.3. Relevance of information
We have discussed how beliefs are grounded in sensorimotor action and anticipa-
tion. It is equally important to ensure that such beliefs are relevant to the agent’s
current and to-be-planned actions. In DiPRA this happens thanks to a combination
of bottom-up and top-down constraints on knowledge extraction.
Knowledge about the current situation is added incrementally as long as the agent
continues to reason and act, which guarantees its relevance to the agent’s current
action. In addition to this bottom-up constraint on knowledge relevance, there is
a top-down, goal directed constraint. Indeed, goals with more resources can re-
enact more related schemas in simulation for the sake of checking their conditions;
this means that the system implicitly explores first the most promising directions
suggested by means-ends analysis. The rationale is that knowledge related to the
goals and plans (e.g. about conditions and actions) becomes more and more relevant
(and is added to the FCM), as long as they continue to have a high activity level
and are thus considered promising. Plans with stronger ‘branches’ in the FCM (i.e.,
those whose subplans and actions have true conditions) are privileged, because top-
level plans gain more activation from them. This is a self-reinforcing process: as long
as the agent continues acting and reasoning, new knowledge about the plan is added
that can further support it. On the contrary, if conditions begin to fail, the whole
’branch’ loses activation. It is worth noting that the two constraints, bottom-up
and top-down, interact. Reasoning in the FCM leads agents to select some courses
of action and not others (and then to activate some schemas and not others), so
there is actually a loop among new knowledge added, new action selected, etc. This
loop produces a bias toward adding knowledge that is both relevant for the agent’s
current goals (and in fact some branches of the FCM are longer than others),
and situated. Note that this kind of loop is typical of active perception systems
(Ballard 1991), too, the difference being that here internal modeling and explicit
representations are used.
5.1.4. Production vs. retrieval of information
It is worth noting that our methodology for belief production and revision, which
consists of monitoring and re-enacting sensorimotor schemas, is an alternative to
the classic view of the ‘storage and retrieval’ of information, popular in cognitive
science and basic theories of memory, and is instead compatible with embodied
cogitive theories (Barsalou 1999, Glenberg 1997). In DiPRA part of the knowledge
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is stored in the FCM structure and can be retrieved. Another part, however, is
produced during sensorimotor interaction or with mental simulations. The ratio-
nale is that anticipation and mental simulations provide access to tacit knowledge
inside internal forward models (see Pezzulo submitted). Such knowledge is typi-
cally used for the sake of action control; it has a procedural and not a declarative
format, and thus cannot be simply ‘retrieved’ from memory. For this reason, the
monitoring of schemas or their re-enactment in simulation is necessary in making
it available outside the original sensorimotor processes and in transforming it from
a procedural to a declarative format. This view is in accordance with recent sim-
ulative views of cognition, which are investigating to what extent tacit knowledge
about one’s own, or others, is accessible (Knoblich and Flach 2003), and how con-
tent is retrieved from memory on-the-fly by means of such embodied simulations
(Barsalou 1999). Although our experiments can be considered preliminary, if this
methodology proves to be effective it will become of extreme interest for computer
scientists designing knowledge-based systems, since it is highly context-dependent
and thus potentially less prone to the frame problem than the classical ‘storage
and retrieval’ approach.
5.2. Use of bounded (computational and knowledge) resources
DiPRA’s intentional layer has two forms of boundednesses. Since few schemas can
run at once, the number of ‘beliefs’ that can be produced is limited, too—this is the
first kind of boundedness in our system. As a side-effect, the system’s ‘epistemic
horizon’ is limited to the current sensorimotor state and (a few) ‘simulations’ of fu-
ture states. The second form of boundedness depends on the fact that the Reasoner
has limited resources, too (whose upper bound can be set by the designer). These
resources put a limit on how much ‘imagination’ can be used during reasoning, and
how many schemas can be re-enacted in simulation to produce expectations—all of
which provides full support for flexible reasoning about the agent’s goals (proximal
or distal).
It is worth noting that, due to these two forms of boundedness, the amount
of computational resources distributed among the layers varies depending on the
current context—this is another fundamental aspect of how DiPRA tackles the
issue of balancing levels of control. For example, in situations that require urgent
behavioral responses (e.g. the presence of a guard), schemas in the sensorimotor
layer tend to tap most resources due to the high activity level of the drives that
fuel them. Many more resources are instead used by the intentional layer when
there is nothing urgent to deal with, and planning is needed. Overall, not only are
DiPRA’s actions determined in a context-sensitive way, but so are its level of control
(intentional or automatic) and the amount of resources it uses in deliberating or
acting.
In order to be effective, the bounded resources allocation mechanism should
provide more resources to those modules which are more important, based on
the agent’s internal context (goals and drives) and external context and stimuli.
How are resources allocated? The mechanism of bounded resource allocation is
based on two factors: desirability and achievability of outcomes. The first aspect,
desirability, is managed in a simple way: goals and drives, which are motivational
components, are able to transfer resources to plans or actions that can satisfy them
(goal-plan links are hand coded in the current implementations, while drive-schema
links are learned). The second aspect, achievability, is based on a prediction-based
mechanism in both layers. The better a schema’s predictions, the more resources
it gains. The same happens to means-ends chains based on reliable beliefs, which
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in turn are based on schemas sensory predictions. This mechanism is based on the
idea of prediction-based selection of context currently popular in motor control
studies (Wolpert et al. 1998, Wolpert and Ghahramani 2004), here extended to
layered architectures.
5.3. Deliberation and means-ends analysis as intertwined processes
In most practical reasoning systems such as BDI (Rao and Georgeff 1995) de-
liberation and goal selection precede means-ends reasoning and the adoption of
plans to achieve intended goals. However, this mechanism has two limitations.
First, knowing that some goals are more achievable than others—something dis-
covered through means-ends analysis—certainly influences goal selection. Second,
during means-ends analysis, novel outcomes and side-effects of goal-directed ac-
tions are ‘discovered’ and evaluated that can bias deliberation. For these reasons it
is better to consider deliberation and means-ends analysis as intertwined processes
that potentially influence each other. This happens naturally in DiPRA’s reasoner.
As discussed above, for the sake of means-ends analysis, beliefs are added to the
FCM that are relevant for the agent’s intended goal(s). This happens since the
intentional layer monitors the sensorimotor layer and can also trigger information-
seeking strategies. For example, a plan needing to check its preconditions can trig-
ger attention shifts and mental simulations, which in turn cause beliefs to be added
to, or removed from, the FCM. However, it is worth noting that not only are plans
more or less supported by novel beliefs, but this process can provide feedback
on deliberation, too, as long as novel outcomes that support or unsupport goals
are considered in the means-ends chain; see, for example, the above mentioned
process of intention reconsideration occurring as a consequence of belief revision.
This mechanism is inspired by recent evidence of co-specification of means and
ends in the brain, which produces a competitive race between multiple goal-plan
ensembles (Cisek 2007, Cisek and Kalaska 2005). It is important to remark that
the usual boundedness principles are in play, so not all possible goals/plans are
considered—only the more promising.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
We have presented a layered agent architecture in which intentional and sensori-
motor layers are seamlessly integrated and interact in two ways:
• Courses of action planned in the intentional layer are realized by schemas
at the sensorimotor layer. This is obtained by activating appropriate sensorimo-
tor schemas, whose expected results satisfy plan conditions and ultimately the
agent’s intention. At the same time, current plans trigger epistemic actions and
channel the gathering of relevant information, which can then be used to refine
practical reasoning.
• Schemas’ activity produces grounded beliefs used for practical reasoning. The
value of beliefs depends on activity level of corresponding schemas, which in turn
is determined by the accuracy of their predictions and simulations.
This loop is regulated by a mechanism of bounded resource allocation, which
operates at both layers based on the desirability of outcomes and prediction ac-
curacy. Our experiments illustrate that DiPRA’s strategy for integrating practical
reasoning and situated action makes it able to deal with a multiplicity of conflicting
goals and the demands of an open-ended environment. Consistent with the ideas
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of Norman and Shallice (1986), DiPRA can steer and control intentional action,
although of course its capabilities are quite far from humans’ higher-level executive
functions. In particular, DiPRA has a remarkable behavioral flexibility in the face
of changing environmental conditions: it is able to replan when novel opportunities
arise for achieving intended goals, and to revise its intentions when these are no
longer achievable. These two capabilities are rarely implemented in robot or agent
architectures operating in complex environments.
As a designer’s note, it is worth mentioning that due to its modular structure
and its mechanisms for allocating resources based on contextual relevance, DiPRA
makes it easy to integrate novel schemas, plans, and goals without hindering ex-
isting ones. At the same time, the current DiPRA implementation has several
limitations that we intend to tackle in our future work. First, in the experiments
presented here, agent embodiment is simplified, and the sensorimotor layer operates
on preprocessed information. However, conceptually similar schema architectures
have been successfully applied to more complex and realistic robotic scenarios, but
at the price of simplifying learning (Roy 2005) or reducing the number of schemas
(Tani 1996). We still lack a sound learning methodology that permits the agent
to autonomously acquire sets of predictors and controllers, in order to operate
in open-ended environments, especially when the agent has multiple drives and
goals. Second, goals and plans are designed by hand, which hinders the system’s
scalability. Unfortunately, although in some cases automatic solutions can replace
hand-coding (e.g., see Pezzulo 2008b on plan generation based on mental simula-
tion), we still lack a sound methodology for autonomously generating hierarchies
in interoperating schemas, plans and goals. Recent theoretical and computational
advances in hierarchical learning architectures (Botvinick et al. 2008, Haruno et al.
2003, Yamashita and Tani 2008) are promising attempts to tackle these problems.
The extent to which these systems can be integrated with practical reasoning capa-
bilities, such as those implemented in DiPRA, is an important direction for further
investigation.
Another limitation of DiPRA is that it is only able to represent knowledge of
‘tangible’ objects and situations. Although we have emphasized here a sensorimotor
and anticipatory origin and grounding of beliefs, this does not mean that there are
not other possible ways of acquiring knowledge for natural and artificial systems.
Not all our knowledge derives from—or is about—our sensorimotor interaction, real
or simulated (see Pezzulo and Castelfranchi 2007, Sloman and Chappell 2005). For
example, our knowledge can depend on memory of past events (the door is be-
lieved to be close because before it was found closed), on other beliefs (e.g., via
inference), or can be formed thanks to (linguistic or not linguistic) communication
with other agents (the door is believed to be close because I was told it is close).
Moreover, there are some forms of knowledge, including abstract concepts and non
perceivable entities, that have a significant degree of detachment from sensorimotor
activity. Although some conceptual solutions to this problem are being developed
in the context of simulative theories of cognition (Barsalou 1999, Grush 2004, Pez-
zulo and Castelfranchi 2007), how to ground all these forms of knowledge remains
an open challenge. However, it is worth noting that one example of alternative
forms of grounding, which that can be defined ‘structural’, ‘tethered’, or ‘internal’
(Minsky 2006, Sloman and Chappell 2005), is already present in DiPRA: inside the
reasoner, some beliefs are grounded on other beliefs instead of on schemas’ activity.
Modules can send activation to each other, as in the case of goals fueling plans that
can satisfy them, or beliefs that sustain a goal or a plan, or that imply another
belief. Beliefs that receive activation by other modules are actually grounded in
internal, coherence-based dynamics and not on sensorimotor interaction. Although
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this is not described in our experiments, it is easy to extend this approach by
using deduction or other forms of inference to produce new beliefs inside the inten-
tional level. How to systematically extend an agent’s knowledge by means of such
‘structural’ or ‘internal’ grounding is an interesting direction for future work.
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Appendix A. Formal description of the intentional layer
Let S be a set of worldstates, P+ a set of atoms, and pi : P+×S → [0..1] a function
assigning a truth value to each atom in each worldstate. P is a set of atoms and
negated atoms where pi(p, s) == 1−pi(¬p, s). L is a propositional language over P
and the logical connectives ∧ and ∨, where: pi(p∧ q, s) := pi(p, s)⊗pi(q, s) and ⊗ is
any continuous triangular norm (e.g. min(p, q), pq); pi(p ∨ q, s) := pi(p, s)⊕ pi(q, s)
and ⊕ is any continuous triangular conorm (e.g. max(p, q), x+y−xy) (see Saffiotti
et al. 1995). The intentional layer of DiPRA is a tuple (Ψ,Γ,Π,Φ, Bel,Ω), where:
• Ψ is the reasoner, a tuple (FCM, Body). FCM is a Fuzzy Cognitive Map
(Kosko 1986), a representation of the state and the relations between all the
modules; Body is the procedural body, whose main task is to assign the status
intended to a goal and adopted to a plan.
• Γ is the set of goals, tuples (Type, Status, GCond, AbsRel, ConRel). Type is
the type of goal: Achieve or Maintain; Status is the current status of the goal:
Intended, Instrumental, Waiting or Not Intended ; GCond ∈ L is the (graded)
satisfaction condition of the goal; AbsRel is the absolute relevance; ConRel is
the contextual relevance.
• Π is the set of plans, tuples (Status, SCond, ECond, PCond, ActionSet, Body,
Goals, Results, AbsRel, PCondRel, ConRel). Status is the current status of
the plan: Adopted or Not Adopted ; SCond is the set of start conditions sc ∈
L which are checked at the beginning of plan execution and must be true to
start it; ECond is the set of enduring conditions ec ∈ L which are checked
continuously during plan execution; if an enduring condition becomes false, the
plan is stopped; PCond is the set of beliefs β ∈ L which are expected to be
true after the plan (but not all of them have to be intended); ActionSet is
the set of actions φ or (sub)goal γ activated by the plan. Actions and goals
are chained inside ActionSet by logical connectives λ; Body is the behavior
which is executed; it normally consists of activating actions and (sub)goals in
the ActionSet; Goals is the set of goals γ that make the plan satisfied; they are
the subset of PCond which are intended (typically when a plan is selected one
of its PCond becomes the Goal, i.e., the main reason for activating the plan);
Results is the set of the final plan results pr ∈ L, corresponding to the GCond
of the Goals at the end of the plan; AbsRel is the absolute reliability value of
the Plan, i.e. how reliably it succeeds; PCondRel is the set of the reliability
values ar ∈ L of the plan with respect to its PConds, i.e. how reliably it produces
its PConds; ConRel is the contextual relevance.
• Φ is the set of actions, tuples (SCond, PCond, Body, Goals, Results, AbsRel,
PCondRel, ConRel). SCond is the set of start conditions sc ∈ L which are
checked at the beginning of action execution and must be true to start it; PCond
is the set of beliefs β ∈ L which are expected to be true after the action (but
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not all of them have to be intended); Body is the behavior which is executed
once the action is executed; Goals is the set of goals γ that make the action
satisfied; they are the subset of PCond which are intended (actually the reasons
for activating the action); Results is the set of the final action results ar ∈ L,
corresponding to the GCond of the Goals at the end of the action; AbsRel is the
absolute reliability value of the Action, i.e. how reliably it succeeds; PCondRel
is the set of the reliability values ar ∈ L of the action with respect to its PConds,
i.e. how reliably it produces its PConds; ConRel is the contextual relevance.
• Bel is the set of epistemic states, i.e. beliefs β ∈ L. All the conditions (GCond,
SCond, PCond, ECond) are kinds of beliefs. Bel are tuples (β, AbsRel, ConRel).
β ∈ L is the value of the belief or condition; AbsRel is the absolute relevance;
ConRel is the contextual relevance.
• Ω is a set of parameters used to control the energetic dynamics of the modules:
σ is the activation of the reasoner; ζ is the threshold for Intending a goal; η is
the threshold for Adopting a plan; θ is the commitment level of intended goals;
κ is the commitment level of adopted plans; ϑ is the total amount of resources
available to the whole system.
A.1. Choice of parameters
In the experiments detailed above, parameters were set as follows: σ = 3; ζ = 0.8;
η = 0.8; θ = 0.3; κ = 0.3; ϑ = 7. The choice of parameters is the result of empir-
ical estimation; however, similar results were obtained by systematically varying
parameters up to 20% of their values, and this indicates a certain robustness1.
A.2. Link types
In the FCM there are six kinds of (weighted) links: (1) Satisfaction A goal links
plans and actions whose PCond satisfy its GCond; in this way, activation is spread
from intended goals to plans which realize them. (2) Predecessor A plan links
(sub)goals whose GCond realize its SCond or ECond; in this way, if a plan has a
missing PCond or ECond it can “subgoal”. (3) Support A belief links goals, plans
or actions which correspond to their GCond, SCond or ECond; this is a way to
represent contextual conditions: goals, plans and actions which are “well attuned”
with the context are preferred. (4) Feedback a plan or action feedbacks on goals;
this special case of support permits to select goals having good paths to action (5)
Inhibition Goals and plans with conflicting GConds or PConds, and plans realizing
the same GCond have inhibitory links. In this way it is possible for a goal or plan
(especially if intended or adopted) to inhibit competitors. (6) Contrast Beliefs have
inhibitory links with plans and goals having conflicting GConds, PConds, SConds
and EConds: this is a kind of “reality check”.
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